

Modeling Market Interactions

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
Why model wholesale electricity markets?

- Markets cover a large portion of the U.S. grid (2/3 of load), as well as many other areas in the world
- Markets (and any associated out-of-market transactions) determine incentives for investment decisions and operational outcomes
 - Current rapid pace of investment in low- or zero-marginal-cost technologies increases the importance of understanding market structure impacts on investment and resource adequacy
 - Uncertainty of future market structure and power system evolution further stress the need to understand market-investment dynamics
- Current leading models do not sufficiently capture the impacts of market structure on both investment and operation outcomes
 - For example, traditional linear programming capacity expansion models (CEMs) assume central planner minimizing system cost and inherently guarantee cost recovery


What is NREL doing about this?

- Develop a capacity expansion model for evaluating the impact of market design and investor heterogeneity on investment decisions and reliability:
Electricity Markets and Investment Suite (EMIS)
 - Represent individual investor firms with heterogeneous beliefs about the future and risk representations
 - Explore how different market designs perform under uncertainty and imperfect information
 - Allow non-optimal investment (i.e., over- or under-investment) by firms with imperfect information
 - Leverage and integrate with the Scalable Integrated Infrastructure Planning (SIIP) modeling framework that include NREL's next generation of *integrated* modeling tools

How can markets efficiently support an ever-evolving power grid?




How does this fit
into NREL's existing
power system
modeling
capabilities?




Credit: Elaine Hale (NREL)

Co-Modeling: Scalable Integrated Infrastructure Planning (SIIP) modeling framework




Credit:
Doug Arent (NREL)

Emerging Economic Modeling Capabilities within SIIP



EMIS Vision:

Multiple firms, technologies, products/timescales, project build phases, and economic/policy scenarios



We currently do not have one model structure that can incorporate all these features, hence the need for a suite of tools

Model Versions: 3 Tracks (“Tools”)

1. Idealized Competitive Equilibrium
2. Agent-Based Simulation
3. Approximate Strategic Equilibrium

Idealized Competitive
Equilibrium (Perfect
competition)

Agent-Based
Simulation

Approximate
Strategic
Equilibrium

Exact Strategic
Equilibrium (Imperfect
competition)

These tools cover the “spectrum” of market and behavior dynamics, with perfect competition on one end and imperfect competition (strategic behavior) on the other. We cannot have an exact strategic equilibrium, so our Approximate Strategic Equilibrium and Agent-Based Simulation tools are a means to approximate the desired heterogenous firm interactions.

Model formulation #1: Idealized Competitive Equilibrium

	Traditional Least-Cost Planning Model	Market Equilibrium Model under Perfect Competition
Objective function	Cost minimization	Social welfare maximization*
Constraints	• Unit- and system-level physical constraints • Any other desired outcomes	• Investor-level constraints • Market rules and supply-demand balance
Decision interpretation	Central planner's least-cost solution	Efficient market outcome given the available price signals

*Reduces to cost minimization under inelastic demand conditions

Model formulation #2: Agent-Based Simulation


Firm 1

Projects in different phases of their lifetimes:

- Potential
- Planned (in queue/under construction)
- Built/Existing

Expected future portfolio and prices

Simple CEM with Firm's belief about future



NPV calculated with Firm's financing parameters
(discount rate, CAPEX multiplier)

Project NPV

Portfolio Optimization:
Build/Retirement
decisions to
Maximize NPV

Actual future (revenues based on what other
Firms built and actual system conditions)

Build/Retirement Decisions

Market Bids

Market
Prices,
Accepted
Bids,
Cleared
Capacities

**Wholesale Market
Clearing**
Energy
Op. Reserves
Capacity
RECs

Firm 2

⋮

Firm n

Model formulation #3: Approximate Strategic Equilibrium

- We are using a surrogate model approach to approximate the theoretically-optimal strategic behavior of an exact strategic equilibrium problem
- Main steps
 1. Simulate the market clearing for many system buildouts
 2. Use machine learning techniques to derive a set of “surrogate” functions that link investment decisions with the resulting profit
 3. Solve resulting full problem iteratively, optimizing each firm’s surrogate sub-problem

EMIS Team Members: Sourabh Dalvi, Bashar Anwar, Gord Stephen, Maxwell Brown, Dave Biagioni, Sean Ericson, Brayam Valqui Ordonez, Michael Craig, and advisor Mark O'Malley

Thank You

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