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IBR Modeling Through the Lifecycle of a Project


Reliability Perspectives

Ryan D. Quint, PhD, PE
Director, Engineering and Security Integration, NERC
ESIG Webinar – December 2023


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"Start with Why" – Simon Sinek



"People don't buy what you do, they buy why you do it." – Simon Sinek





What was studied



What was installed







Standard Library Model

- Simplified representation of control modes
- Fully transparent model given simplicity
- Often inability to represent actual OEM control strategies
- No or very limited ability to represent protection




User-Defined Model

- More detailed representation of OEM control strategies
- “Black box” model given detailed controls
- Can represent some or most of the OEM controls
- May represent some protections
- Still limited by software platform


EMT Model

- Most detailed representation of IBR
- Still generally an aggregated plant representation
- Includes inner control loops (very fast time step)
- Phase-based (not positive sequence)
- Can identify ride-through issues and interactions
- Minimal software limitations
- Data confidentiality issues

- Accurate models are *absolutely critical* for reliable operation of the bulk power system
 - Used in long-term planning, operations planning, and real-time operations
- Model inaccuracy leads to reliability issues **AND** possibly to delays in the interconnection process
- Process improvements around modeling and study challenges can bring clarity to both transmission and generation sides
- Model accuracy is not just usability (definition of the past)
- Model accuracy refers to matching the as-built facility, models with sufficient fidelity (ability to represent controls/protections), usability, etc.



- OEM-supplied info = proof
- Standard library model is a BAD match to actual product
 - Steady-state differences
 - Dynamic response differences
 - Higher fidelity in UDM
 - More stability-related dynamics present in UDM



1,200 MW Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report

Southern California 8/16/2016 Event
June 2017

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Industry Recommendation
Loss of Solar Resources during Transmission Disturbances due to Inverter Settings

Initial Distribution: June 20, 2017

NERC identified a potential characteristic exhibited by some inverter-based resources, particularly utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) generators, which require power restored during fault conditions on the transmission system. An example of this behavior has been observed during recent IRTS disturbances, highlighting potential risks to IRTS reliability. With the recent and expected increases of utility-scale solar resources, the causes of this induction of power outages from utility-scale power resources needs to be widely communicated and addressed by the industry. This industry should identify remedial planning actions in the area of power system modeling and coordination to reduce the system reliability impact in the event of an unexpected loss of solar resources during faults on the power system.

For more information, see the [1,200 MW Fault-Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report](#).

About NERC Alerts: [Acknowledgment Required by Member Entities on June 27, 2017](#)
[Reporting Required by Member Entities on August 9, 2017](#)

Public: No Restrictions
More on [NERC Alerts](#)

Industry Recommendation
This recommendation provides specific actions NERC registered entities should consider taking to respond to a potential issue. Respond to the IRTS of NERC, Rules of Procedure, NERC registered entities shall 30 days acknowledge receipt of this advisory with the NERC. Each entity, and 30 report to NERC on the status of their activities in relation to this recommendation as provided below. For U.S. entities, NERC will compile the reports and report the results to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

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900 MW Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbance Report

Southern California Event: October 9, 2017
Joint NERC and WECC Staff Report
February 2018

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Industry Recommendation
Loss of Solar Resources during Transmission Disturbances due to Inverter Settings - II

Initial Distribution: May 3, 2018

NERC has identified a new characteristic of inverter-based resource performance during grid faults that could present potential risks to reliability of the IRTS. As the penetration of inverter-based resources continues to increase, these characteristics may be widely communicated. This user 1 Industry Recommendation alerts industry to these adverse characteristics exhibited by IRTS-connected solar PV resources and provides recommended actions to address fault ride-through and timely restoration of current injections at all inverter-based resources connected to the IRTS.

Although this NERC alert pertains specifically to IRTS solar PV resources, the same characteristics may exist for non-IRTS solar PV resources connected to the IRTS regardless of inverter technology.

For more information, see the October 9, 2017 [Caption 2 of the Disturbance Report](#).

About NERC Alerts: [Acknowledgment Required by Member Entities on July 7, 2018](#)
[Reporting Required by Member Entities on July 17, 2018](#)

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For more information, see the October 9, 2017 [Caption 2 of the Disturbance Report](#).

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April and May 2018 Fault Induced Solar Photovoltaic Resource Interruption Disturbances Report

Southern California Events: April 20, 2018 and May 11, 2018
Joint NERC and WECC Staff Report
January 2019

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Odessa Disturbance
Texas Events: May 9, 2021 and June 26, 2021
Joint NERC and Texas RE Staff Report
September 2021

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Multiple Solar PV Disturbances in CAISO
Disturbances between June and August 2021
Joint NERC and WECC Staff Report
April 2022

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Panhandle Wind Disturbance
Texas Event: March 22, 2022
Joint NERC and Texas RE Staff Report
August 2022

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2022 Odessa Disturbance
Texas Event: June 4, 2022
Joint NERC and Texas RE Staff Report
December 2022

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Industry Recommendation
Inverter-Based Resource Performance Issues

Initial Distribution: March 14, 2023

NERC analyzed multiple large-scale disturbances on the bulk power system (BPS) involving independent loss of inverter-based resources (IBRs) in 2021 and 2022. Two disturbances in Odessa, Texas, resulted in abnormal performance across several Bulk Electric System (BES) solar photovoltaic (PV) generating resources. These resources have exhibited system performance issues that could lead to unexpected loss of BPS-connected generation, with the potential to cause widespread outages. As the penetration of BPS-connected IBRs continues to rapidly increase, it is important that our professional staff and industry partners take generation resources to address an as identified and prevent recurrence.

While this user 1 alert is being distributed to Member Entities (MEs) of the IRTS, PV resources, the recommendations should also be reviewed and implemented by owners of all BPS-connected solar PV resources. See Background section for more information. The alert also asks to gather data from solar PV asset owners to understand whether additional actions are necessary to mitigate possible BPS performance risks. Qualified MEs are strongly encouraged to consult their inverter and asset-level distributed manufacturers, review inverter settings, and confirm compliance related to the field, and implement the recommendations described herein, and review the information with the associated Customer Operations (CO) as applicable.

Note: This alert pertains specifically to solar PV resources; however, the recommendations may be applicable to BPS-connected battery storage systems (BESS). This alert does not pertain to wind resources as the observed performance issues are different.

For more information, see the NERC Major Event Analysis Report [20220604](#), all reports on strongly encouraged to read the findings from these reports, particularly the 2022 Odessa Disturbance [20220604](#) and the 2022 Odessa Disturbance [20220604](#).

Why are I am looking this? [About NERC Alerts](#)

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San Fernando Disturbance
Southern California Event: July 7, 2020
Joint NERC and WECC Staff Report
November 2020

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2023 Southwest Utah Disturbance
Southwestern Utah: April 10, 2023
Joint NERC and WECC Staff Report
August 2023

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2022 California Battery Energy Storage System Disturbances
California Events: March 9 and April 6, 2022
Joint NERC and WECC Staff Report
September 2023

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
Table 3.1: Solar PV Tripping and Modeling Capabilities and Practices

Cause of Reduction	Can Be Accurately Modeled in Positive Sequence Simulations?	Can Be Accurately Modeled in EMT Simulations?
Inverter Instantaneous AC Overcurrent	No	Yes
Passive Anti-Islanding (Phase Jump)	Yes ^a	Yes
Inverter Instantaneous AC Overvoltage	No	Yes
Inverter DC Bus Voltage Unbalance	No	Yes
Feeder Underfrequency	No ^b	No ^c
Incorrect Ride-Through Configuration	Yes	Yes
Plant Controller Interactions	Yes ^d	Yes ^e
Momentary Cessation	Yes	Yes
Inverter Overfrequency	No ^b	Yes
PLL Loss of Synchronism	No	Yes
Feeder AC Overvoltage	Yes ^f	Yes
Inverter Underfrequency	No ^b	Yes

Table 3.4: Review of Solar PV Facilities

Facility ID	Reduction [MW]	Cause of Reduction	Positive Sequence Model Capable?	EMT Model Capable?
Plant B	133	Inverter phase jump (passive anti-islanding) tripping.	Unknown*	Unknown
Plant C	56	Inverter phase jump (passive anti-islanding) tripping.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant E	159	Inverter ac overvoltage tripping.	Unknown*	Unknown
Plant U	136	Inverter ac overvoltage tripping; feeder underfrequency tripping.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant F	46	Unknown.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant I	196	Inverter phase jump (passive anti-islanding) tripping.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant J	106	Inverter dc voltage imbalance tripping.	Unknown	Unknown
Plants K + L	130	Momentary cessation/inverter power supply failure.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant M	146	Inverter dc voltage imbalance tripping; incorrect inverter ride through configuration.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant N	35	Unknown.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant O	15	Unknown.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant P	10	Inverter ac overcurrent tripping.	Unknown*	Unknown
Plant Q	12	Inverter ac overcurrent tripping.	Unknown	Unknown
Plant R	261	Inverter ac overcurrent tripping.	Unknown*	Unknown
Plant S	94	Inverter dc voltage imbalance tripping.	Unknown*	Unknown
Plant T	176	Inverter ac overcurrent tripping; feeder underfrequency tripping.	Unknown*	Unknown

ERCOT's answer...
(Circa 2022)



- Older “legacy” resources
- 920 MW loss across 9 facilities
- Systemic inverter tripping issues
- No action taken by industry based on guidelines and reports published by NERC
- Latent BPS risks that threaten BPS reliability
- Inadequate modeling and studies (older plants)


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2022 California Battery Energy Storage System Disturbances

California Events: March 9 and April 6, 2022
Joint NERC and WECC Staff Report


September 2023

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
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- Same story, different resource type
- Systemic inverter tripping issues
- Inadequate ride-through assessments conducted
- Poor commissioning practices
- Bad data, lost data, etc.
- Questionable modeling practices
- Relatively new facilities




- FERC IBR Registration Order in November 2022 (Docket No. RD22-4)
 - FERC approved NERC's Work Plan in May 2023
- ERO Enterprise coordinating with stakeholders on draft Rules of Procedure changes in June – August 2023
- ROP Revisions posted in September – October
 - Revisions to ROP Appendix 2, 5A, and 5B
- Proposes new “GO-IBR” and “GOP-IBR” functions
 - “...if the entity owns, maintains, or operates non-BES inverter-based generating resources that have an aggregate nameplate capacity of greater than or equal to 20 MVA, delivering such capacity to a common point of connection at a voltage greater than or equal to 60 kV.”⁹


- Project 2020-02: PRC-024 Generator Ride-Through
- Project 2020-06: Verifications of Models and Data for Generators
- Project 2021-01: Modifications to MOD-025 and PRC-019
- Project 2021-04: Modifications to PRC-002-2
- Project 2022-02: Modifications to TPL-001-5.1 and MOD-032-1
- Project 2022-04: EMT Modeling
- Likely more on the horizon... (FERC Order No. 901)



- Require each interconnection customer of non-synchronous (IBR) generating facility to submit to transmission provider:
 - Validated user-defined RMS positive sequence dynamic model
 - Appropriately parameterized standard library RMS positive sequence dynamic model
 - Include model block diagram of inverter control system and plant control system
 - New table of “acceptable models” in procedures, or model approved by WECC
 - Validated EMT model if transmission provider performs EMT study as part of interconnection study process
- Defines “user-defined model” as:
 - “[A]ny set of programming code created by [OEMs] or developers that captures the latest features of controllers that are mainly software-based and represent the entities’ control strategies but does not necessarily correspond to any particular generic library model...”


- Requires any proposed modification to interconnection request be accompanied by updated models of proposed facility
- Cure period for model deficiencies; failures to meet requirements considered “incomplete” and “invalid”
- “Definition of a validated model (i.e., confirmation that the equipment behavior is consistent with the modeled behavior) is sufficiently flexible to enable interconnection customers to provide such a model with their interconnection requests.”
 - “...attestation that the models accurately reflect the...facility...based [on] best understanding at the time...[provides] further flexibility...to change the equipment or control systems of the proposed generating facility...”





[Dynamic Modeling Recommendations \(nerc.com\)](http://www.nerc.com)

- Dynamic Modeling Recommendations
 - Recommended dynamic modeling practices
 - Positive sequence library models
 - Positive sequence user-defined models (UDM)
 - Electromagnetic transient (EMT) models
 - Geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) models
 - Applicability to MOD-032
 - Guidance on which models to use for different types of reliability studies
 - Focus on ensuring model quality – accuracy, usability, fidelity, etc.
- Acceptable/Unacceptable Model List
 - Retired “NERC Acceptable Model List” – often misinterpreted and needed a rewrite
 - This Dynamic Modeling Recommendations document replaces that list
- Relation to FERC Order 901




- Dynamic models are used in reliability studies throughout the life cycle of a project.
- The recommended use of dynamic models across these studies varies based on the type of study being conducted
- For all studies, EMT models should be used if positive sequence simulation platforms or models are insufficient, or if high accuracy is desired


- All models should be detailed and accurate representations of ***expected or as-built facilities*** on the BPS
 - Including during interconnection studies and throughout the lifecycle of a project.
- Each TP and PC should establish clear, consistent, sufficiently detailed, and comprehensive modeling requirements.
 - Should include model quality checks and updates when needed.
- Project developers and GOs should meet the modeling requirements established by the TP and PC and provide adequate proof of conformance to the requirements.
 - Maintain an accurate model throughout the lifecycle of the project
 - Notify TP and PC of any expected changes or updates per NERC FAC-002 for in-service equipment; submit updated models accordingly

- Planners should require **all** the following for **all** BPS-connected generators:
 - Positive sequence standard library model
 - **Not** on the list of unacceptable models
 - Used for interconnection-wide cases to represent facilities outside study areas
 - Positive sequence user-defined model (UDM)
 - Used for system impact studies and local stability studies
 - Electromagnetic transient (EMT) model
 - Used for studying detailed BPS reliability risks increasingly prevalent and necessary for inverter-based resources
 - All models should be verified by OEM to be **accurately parameterized** to represent **site-specific** controls, settings, and protections with supporting documentation and attestations.
 - All submitted models should have an accompanying benchmarking report comparing models against each other (and discrepancies identified)

- MOD-032 designees have responsibility of creating interconnection-wide base cases used as starting point for TP and PC reliability studies
- Submitted models should meet all applicable requirements (including model acceptance criteria) and be accompanied by detailed documentation.
 - User manuals, OEM attestations, mapping between the model parameters, installed or to-be-installed facility settings, benchmark reports that show matching performance between the models
- Standard library models are sufficient for use in interconnection-wide base case creation but should be validated by the OEM and benchmarked against the OEM-verified EMT model or OEM-verified user-defined positive sequence model with the as-left or to-be-commissioned facility settings



- Directs enhancements to NERC Reliability Standards related to:
 - Terms of “Registered IBRs,” “unregistered IBR,” and “IBR-DERs”
 - Data sharing – modeling data and disturbance monitoring
 - Data and model validation
 - Standard library models
 - Steady-state, short-circuit, and dynamics
 - DER_A model for IBR-DERs
 - Model accuracy
 - Provisions for inability to gather data
 - System model validation
 - Planning and operational studies
 - Expanded grid conditions to study (e.g., low inertia)
 - Performance requirements
 - Ride-through performance, current injection, minimal exemptions



- Order No. 901 requires use of “approved industry generic library IBR models”
 - Steady state, short-circuit, and dynamics (no EMT, but did “encourage NERC and stakeholders to continue working in this area”
 - Planning, operations, and interconnection-wide models
 - Could reference NERC approved component model list
 - Per MOD-032-1, list defines models that may or may not be used in interconnection-wide base case creation
 - Includes IBR standard library models (i.e., “WECC models”)
 - “We decline[d] to...allow NERC the discretion to include alternatives to approved industry generic library models...”
 - “...similarly decline[d] to...allow transmission providers the discretion to diverge from the approved nation-wide component model list.”

- Order No. 2023 includes use of user-defined models for interconnection studies
- FERC expressed differences between interconnection studies and planning and operations studies; stated:
 - Interconnection study models “not typically shared or combined with models from neighboring systems”
 - Concerns with data sharing, model combination, model convergence, model transparency issues, etc.
 - Did not disallow TPs/PCs collecting UDMs but prohibited them for use in interconnection-wide base cases “so that [BPS] planners and operators can adequately predict behaviors and subsequent impacts to the reliable operation of the [BPS].”
- Highlighted entities that prefer or only allow standard library models: AEP, CAISO, ISO-NE, LADWP, PJM, NYSRC, etc.

- FERC also directed NERC “to establish a standard uniform model verification process”
 - Models are complete and accurately represent the dynamic behavior of resources at a sufficient level of fidelity”
 - Highlighted consistency among processes for FAC-002, MOD-026, and MOD-027
- NERC Project 2020-06 is revamping the model verification process presently


Without adequate modeling requirements, Transmission Planners cannot gather sufficient models from Interconnecting Customers. These requirements must be clear and consistent.

Just requiring models is not enough; those models must be checked for accuracy and sufficiency.

With an accurate model, the interconnecting facility can be tested to ensure it meets the performance requirements established.

Transmission Planners need to begin integrating EMT studies and rethinking positive sequence modeling and study processes.

Planning studies using EMT models will likely increase, other studies likely expand scenarios and sensitivities.



[NERC EMT Task Force](#)

*EMT = Electromagnetic Transient

A stylized map of North America, including the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The map is rendered in shades of blue and grey, with the United States and Canada in a darker blue and Mexico in a lighter grey. The map is positioned behind a horizontal band that is dark blue on top and light blue on the bottom.

Questions and Answers

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