# **Update from DC**

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## Congress

#### Tax legislation

- 2015 renewable tax credit phase-out deal appears to be safe
- A reduction in the corporate tax rate could reduce the value of renewable tax credits for tax equity investors
- Immediate expensing (instead of interest deductibility) could benefit capital-intensive renewables

#### Infrastructure legislation

- Congress may not get to it
- In theory could drive transmission, although tax credit proposal offers little benefit for most utilities

#### **Federal Trade Commission**

#### Suniva case

- FTC unanimously found harm, FTC's proposed remedy (early November) and Trump decision still TBD
- Proposed module price floor and tariffs could harm US solar installations
- MAKE estimates Suniva's proposed \$0.78/W module floor price would double utility solar 2018 LCOE to \$60/MWh



## **DOE Grid Study Report**

#### The report correctly finds:

- Reliability is good.
- The primary factor causing coal and nuclear plant retirements is low gas prices.
- Wind energy now provides the reliability services offered by existing resources.


#### The report also provides a number of valuable policy recommendations:

- Valuing essential reliability services, such as those increasingly provided by renewables.
- Minimizing regulatory barriers to energy production and transmission.
- Accelerating transmission development.



## Renewables not primary factor affecting coal and nuclear


Recent and Planned Coal and Nuclear Retirements and 2016 U.S. Renewable Energy\* Share of Electricity Generation, by State





## Cheap gas is primary factor

Recent and Planned Coal Retirements and Economics of Coal versus Natural Gas, by Region





## **Data on negative prices**

- AWEA analyzed 2016 price data at all retiring power plants in wind-heavy ISOs.
- Out of 1.8 million data points, only 55 prices were in the range set by PTC wind projects.
- Removing incentives would have trivial impact on prices, at a fraction of a penny per MWh, particularly for the Day-Ahead markets where coal and nuclear sell their output.

Market prices at	Real-Time or Day-Ahead	Share of prices that are	Prices between -\$20 and -\$40	Average market price	Average price if all -\$20 to	Price change if wind offered
retiring	Market	negative	/MWh (offer	market price	-\$40/MWh	\$0/MWh
generators,			range for PTC +		prices were	
by ISO			REC wind		\$0/MWh	
			project)			
	Real-Time	0.88%	0.12%	\$26.41	\$26.44	\$0.03
PJM	Day-Ahead	0.18%	0.003%	\$26.8811	\$26.8818	\$0.0007
	Real-Time	1.62%	0.03%	\$21.7825	\$21.7888	\$0.0063
ERCOT	Day-Ahead	0.08%	0.06%	\$22.635	\$22.649	\$0.014
	Real-Time	2.04%	0.54%	\$21.32	\$21.49	\$0.17
SPP	Day-Ahead	0.59%	0.0017%	\$21.9965	\$21.9969	\$0.0004
	Real-Time	1.20%	0.14%	\$25.413	\$25.451	\$0.038
MISO	Day-Ahead	0.22%	0.003%	\$25.6803	\$21.6810	\$0.0007



## Renewables provide reliability services

Reliability Service	Wind	Solar PV	Gas	Coal	Nuclear
Disturbance ride-through					
Note: For the following reliability se many hours it may not be the most o	The state of the s		urce can prov	ide the servic	e but during
		Le to do so.			
Reactive and voltage control					
Frequency regulation					
Flexibility					
Primary frequency response and					
inertial response to disturbances					
	Wind	Solar PV	Gas	Coal	Nuclear
inertial response to disturbances	ervices, score re	eflects risk of co	ommon mode		
inertial response to disturbances Resilience Service Note: For the following resilience se	ervices, score re	eflects risk of co	ommon mode		
inertial response to disturbances Resilience Service Note: For the following resilience se fleetwide output below capacity val	ervices, score re	eflects risk of co	ommon mode		
inertial response to disturbances Resilience Service Note: For the following resilience se fleetwide output below capacity val Cold weather resilience	ervices, score re	eflects risk of co	ommon mode		
inertial response to disturbances Resilience Service Note: For the following resilience se fleetwide output below capacity val Cold weather resilience Hot weather resilience	ervices, score re	eflects risk of co	ommon mode		
inertial response to disturbances Resilience Service Note: For the following resilience sefleetwide output below capacity val Cold weather resilience Hot weather resilience Fuel delivery resilience	ervices, score re	eflects risk of co	ommon mode		
Resilience Service  Note: For the following resilience seffeetwide output below capacity val  Cold weather resilience  Hot weather resilience  Fuel delivery resilience  Cooling water resilience  Impact on System Variability  Impact on operating reserves and	ervices, score re ue during chall	enging time pe	ommon mode riod.	unavailability	reducing
inertial response to disturbances Resilience Service Note: For the following resilience sefleetwide output below capacity val Cold weather resilience Hot weather resilience Fuel delivery resilience Cooling water resilience Impact on System Variability	ervices, score re ue during chall	enging time pe	ommon mode riod.	unavailability	reducing

Wind turbine power electronics provide excellent ride-through and voltage and reactive control

- ERCOT obtains much of its downward primary frequency response from wind plants
- Xcel Colorado often uses wind to regulate frequency
- All ISOs now fully dispatch wind under the same market rules as other resources
- Wind plants outperformed as many fossil plants faced forced outages in Polar Vortex and 2011 ERCOT cold snap
- Contingency reserves for large conventional plant failures more expensive than slow reserves for wind variability

For a more detailed version of this table with linked citations, please visit <a href="http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/Services%20Graphic.pdf">http://awea.files.cms-plus.com/FileDownloads/pdfs/Services%20Graphic.pdf</a>

that service.



## **DOE** proposal to FERC

- "would bring an end to competitive power markets, is not clearly needed to ensure grid reliability and resiliency, and would be very expensive." Morgan Stanley
- "Effectively re-regulating a major portion of the currently de-regulated organized markets via a cost-ofservice system would presumably render any existing discernable market pricing mechanisms irrelevant."
   JP Morgan
- "DOE rulemaking threatens to destroy wholesale markets with no tangible benefit" **Energy Innovation**
- "a dreadful policy proposal" Alison Silverstein, DOE consultant
- "this proposed rule has something for everyone to dislike" **Advanced Energy Economy**
- "the proposal is an arbitrary backdoor subsidy to coal and nuclear plants that risks undermining electrical competition throughout the United States." conservative R Street Institute
- "the proposal from the Department of Energy is an excessive and unnecessarily distortive means of pursuing a more appropriate valuation for secure baseload generation capacity. Like using a sledgehammer to swat a fly, this rule would end up causing enormous destruction even if it also managed to provide more resilient baseload capacity. Guaranteeing cost recovery for certain types of generation would destroy electricity markets." Koch front group IER
- "I have never seen a credible argument not one that there is a problem with resiliency and reliability." "The irony is that Republicans which is supposed to be the party of fiscal responsibility and market solutions have been the least supportive of markets in the electricity sector since they were developed." Republican former FERC Commissioner Nora Brownell
- "Christmas turd" Pat Wood III, Republican former FERC Chair, Chairman of coal-heavy Dynegy



### **Broad Anti-NOPR Coalition**

#### Process

- AWEA, SEIA, ELCON (large consumers), NRECA, APPA, EPSA, American Petroleum Institute, etc joint filing
- Argued 60 days for decision not enough, evidentiary record insufficient, etc
- Initial procedural filings rejected: Comments to FERC due October 23, reply comments November 7
- FERC must respond to DOE in some fashion, unlikely to accept order as drafted
- Last week, FERC staff posed dozens of questions for commenters to answer

#### Substantive comments

- Competitive providers filed letter in opposition yesterday: Dynegy, Invenergy, Tenaska, CPV, LS Power
- Many others are working on comments

#### Primary points to be made


- No emergency: reliability and resilience is good and increasing per NERC, DOE, ISOs, etc
- No evidentiary record to support proposed order
- Proposed requirements (90 days onsite fuel, ability to provide "operating reserves" and "frequency services") are arbitrary and many coal and nuclear plants do not meet them
- Need diversity of resources to provide diversity of needed services
- Cost-of-service per MWh payments will distort if not destroy electricity markets that provide reliability
- Proposal would add billions to consumers' electric bills for no benefit
- Strengthening grid and markets will benefit consumers and reliability



## Transmission builds resilience

Figure 1: Cause of major electricity disturbances in the US, 2012-2016

Share of total customer-hours disrupted



Source: EIA and Rhodium Group analysis

- Fix cost allocation and planning, particularly for interregional transmission
- Streamline permitting of transmission





FERC should work with ISOs to explore market reforms that value needed services without favoring any particular resource or undertaking a risky overhaul of the wholesale markets. Potential market reforms could include:

- Co-optimize energy and ancillary service markets to ensure that resources are adequately compensated for providing ancillary services.
- Expand ancillary services markets to fully compensate resources for the grid services they provide, including payment for reactive power service.
- Remove barriers to market participation for demand response and other innovative resources, including allowing end-use resources to see real-time price.
- Finalize NOPR on Primary Frequency Response and direct RTOs/ISOs to develop markets for procurement and compensation of the service including premium for fast product.
- Finalize the Fast-Start Pricing NOPR, and potentially expand to resources other than Fast-Start, to increase dispatch efficiency and minimize uplift costs.
- Bring self-scheduled resources into markets.
- Ensure capacity market rules are not discriminatory.
- Implement probabilistic unit commitment.
- Promote markets and efficient operating practices, particularly in the Western U.S.